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Caste privilege persists in the form of upper caste “networks” in India made up of political, social, and economic relations that tend
to actively exclude lower caste members. In this study, we examine this pernicious expression of caste in the Twitter networks of
politicians from India’s highest legislative body - the Lok Sabha. We find that caste has a significant relationship with the centrality,
connectivity and engagement of an MP in the Lok Sabha Twitter network. The higher the caste of a Member of the Parliament (MP)
the more likely they are to be important in the network, to have reciprocal connections with other MPs, and to get retweeted by an
upper caste MPs.
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1 BACKGROUND
The role and performance of networks are critical, especially in positions of power. One setting to observe caste-based
fraternizing, where individual actors can both act and enact power, is in the parliament. We studied Twitter networks
of members of an institution which represents a diversity of caste identities - the Lok Sabha. In the years since the 2014
general election, social media is increasingly the preferred means of primary communication by major political leaders -
a place for them to manage their brands, communicate policy, perform politics without the mediation of professional
journalists. What politicians do online - who they communicate with, follow, or retweet, are integrally tied into the
ways they perform and reciprocate relationships with their networks and their electoral base. The network effects of
caste relations are well known among lower caste communities who are often treated as token diversity or restricted
access to important connections or promotions in workplaces. But, how exactly do these network effects result in
exclusion of Dalit, Bahujan or Adivasi people?
We asked three questions to this network: - 1. Is there a relationship between the caste of a Lok Sabha member and
how they choose to follow other Lok Sabha members? We measured this by looking at how well an MP’s following is
reciprocated in the network. 2. Is there a relationship between the caste of a Lok Sabha member and how important they
are in the network? We measured this by looking at how well followed an MP is in the network and how parsimonious
they are with their connections. 3. Is there a relationship between the caste of a Lok Sabha member and whom they
choose to engage with? We measured this through the odds of an MP getting retweeted by an Upper-Caste MP in the
network.
Authors’ addresses: Palashi Vaghela, Cornell University, New York, USA, palashi@infosci.cornell.edu; Ramaravind Kommiya Mothilal, Microsoft Research,
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2We found that caste indeed has a very significant relationship with an MP’s importance, connectivity and engagement
in the Lok Sabha network. The higher your caste, the more likely you are to have a reciprocal connection with Lok
Sabha members. Second, the higher your caste, the more likely you are to be important in the network. Third, the
higher your caste, the more likely you are to get retweeted by a higher caste Lok Sabha member.
2 METHODS
2.1 Data
We used a database of Indian politicians on Twitter, created using a Machine Learning classification pipeline called
NivaDuck [9], to get Twitter profiles of politicians in India and map them to the list of Members of Parliament (MPs)
through partial string matching of names. We manually checked Twitter description, tweet content, account creation
date, and party. At the end of this process, we found that 489 out of 542 currently sitting MPs have a Twitter presence.
Out of the 489, 465 MPs had Twitter accounts that were active at the time of our study.
We used the SPINPER database [11], that tracks historical information of caste and religion of elected MPs of India,
to annotate the castes of the members of Lok Sabha. Through a combination of string matching and manual data
processing, we classified the 449 MPs from Hindu religion and into six caste categories: Brahmins, Other Forward
Castes (Non-Brahmin Upper Castes), Intermediary Castes (IC), Other Backward Castes (OBC), Scheduled Castes (SC), and
Scheduled Tribes (ST). Intermediary castes indicate a group of castes that are historically Upper-Caste but are fighting
for a change of status to Lower-Caste through political and social movements, for example, Jats, Lingayaths, Patels, etc.
For the purpose of this study, we are not looking at castes in religions other than Hinduism, although we acknowledge
that they exist and play an active role in the political landscape of India. We took the Hindu caste category to be an
ordinal variable based on the graded hierarchy as understood in the varna system – Brahmins > Other Forward Castes
> Intermediary Castes > Other Backward Castes > Scheduled Castes > Scheduled Tribes [3, 5].
The data on follow networks of Lok Sabha MPs was collected using the public API of Twitter. We considered links
made between two MPs in the period of March 2019 and February 2020 owing to important socio-political events like
General Elections, legislative and constitutional changes following the elections, etc. We believe this would have shifted
the dynamics of who follows whom over the period of that year. We found that 308 MPs of the 465 active Twitter
accounts follow each other. The follow links help us understand network properties like centrality and reciprocity.
As a way of understanding relationships of engagement among the MPs in this period, we look at the odds of being
retweeting in the network by an Upper-Caste MP.
We assumed that the political party of the MP would interplay with caste in terms of connections, centrality and
engagement because of ideological differences and ascension dependent on whether you are part of the ruling or
opposition. Close to 60% of the sitting MPs belong to Bharatiya Janata Party) (BJP,) and Indian National Congress (INC)
has only 14% of BJP’s strength. Thus we bifurcated the MPs as belonging to BJP or non-BJP, and this is a distinction we
maintain for the rest of the paper referring to each of the groups as “party” to improve comprehension.
2.2 Structural Network Measures
Studies done in sociology and anthropology point to caste as a form of relation that approaches the idea of inclusion
and exclusion as a matter of relative effect of whether or not one is part of a network. In fact, some scholars have
suggested that social networks might be a more effective way to understand abstract relations between groups. One of
the ways of tracing these relations is to look at their concrete manifestation [13]. In our case, whether you decide to
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follow or engage with somebody working in the same institution as you, count as concrete measures of being related to
someone on Twitter. In a caste society, to understand how each network relates to each other as a whole (for example a
caste category determined through scriptures and kinship,) one would need to abstract and synthesize the group level
effects of how these relations dynamically unfold between different caste categories [12].
To that end, first, we studied two structural properties of the follow network of MPs - Reciprocity and PageRank
Centrality [1, 14]. When observed at an aggregate level between different groups of caste, it helped us understand how
caste based exclusion can manifest online in the Lok Sabha network. We compared the median values between each
pair of castes within BJP and Non-BJP separately. While not exhaustive, these two properties ascertain some of the
most important and subtle insights about influence of caste on following behaviour.
Further, the reciprocity and centrality measures of a node rely on information from other nodes in the network
and hence are not independent. Thus, the standard statistical assumptions about independent observations and data
distributions do not hold. We resort to permutation tests to compute the significance of the difference between medians,
similar to other studies that compare network properties [4, 10]. We randomly swapped the positions of MPs in the
network 10,000 times and estimated the difference in medians between two groups in each trial. Next, we compared
this distribution of differences to the observed difference in medians. The p-value equals the proportion of differences
that are at least as extreme as the observed value, and we considered the difference to be significant at 0.05.
2.3 Retweets and Odds Ratios
Retweets indicate a wide range of functions, such as publicly validating a message or signaling an alignment of interests.
[2, 6–8, 15, 16]. To understand the role of party and caste hierarchy in getting higher retweets, we sought to understand
if belonging to a particular caste had any association with getting retweeted by Upper-Caste MPs. The goal of this
research question was to understand if castes higher up in the ladder prefer retweeting tweets of specific castes versus
others. Empirically, for each pair of castes, we use a Fisher’s exact test to determine the significance of relative odds of
getting retweeted by upper castes.
3 FINDINGS
We find that while the relationships between caste show important patterns across party, the nature of the parties and
their network structure impacts who connects with, reciprocates, and amplifies the message of which parliamentary
colleague.
3.1 Reciprocity and Party Affiliation
Within the BJP:We see that Brahmins MPs have a significant advantage over all the Lower-Caste MPs in terms of
getting reciprocal following links from other MPs in the network in Figure 1(a). As we find in the bottom-most row,
their median reciprocity is significantly higher than that of all Lower-Caste categories.
This advantage also spreads to other upper caste MPs. As we see in second row from the bottom, Other Forward
Castes get more reciprocal links from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and this is then followed by Intermediary
Castes who have higher median reciprocity than Scheduled Tribes.
In summary, Brahmins seem to dominate in terms of forming reciprocal links in the BJP, while Scheduled Tribes MPs
have the least proportion of mutual connections to the number of MPs they follow. Essentially, a strong set of conscious
or unconscious relationships of reciprocity are visible in these connections.
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(a) Reciprocitycaste1 - Reciprocitycaste2
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(b) PageRankcaste1 - PageRankcaste2
Fig. 1. The left panes in each of the figures (a,b) show the difference between the median value of each network property, Reciprocity
and PageRank centrality between each pair of castes within BJP MPs. The right panes show the same within Non-BJP MPs. The
color green or red indicate if caste 1 (rows) has a significantly higher or lower median than caste 2 (columns) respectively. The grey
cells correspond to insignificant differences. The significance is computed using permutation tests and all non-zero differences are
significant at 0.05 level.
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Among non-BJP parties:We felt that the relationships between MPs may be more complicated because of cross party
engagements and may confound the effect of caste on network properties, but we also see some comparables to the
patterns seen with the BJP.
One difference is seen in the right panel of Figure 1(a). We find that Scheduled Tribes MPs are less reciprocated in
their “following" than all Upper-Caste MP. Also, while Other Forward Castes MPs, form only a small share of the sample
at about 10% of Non-BJP MPs, they seem to have higher reciprocity than all lower caste MPs from non-BJP parties,
including the Other Backward Castes who are more than 30% of the total strength.
There is however one important symmetrical property that appears to exist across parties. The caste categories
that have highest median reciprocities, Brahmins in BJP and Other Forward Castes in Non-BJP, have significantly less
variance in reciprocity than the castes with next higher median values.
The findings here could imply that the tendency among Upper-Caste MPs to follow back those who send them
following requests is low, or conversely, that Lower-Caste have a lower likelihood of getting followed back by others.
It is clear that the propensity or ability to form mutual links by Upper-Caste MPs is significantly greater than
Lower-Caste, indicating that perhaps the social capital and other factors affecting Lower-Caste MPs are shaping how
they can effectively be excluded by Upper-Caste MPs in the network.
Since we cannot tell the temporal relationships – i.e. who followed whom and when, one way to think of these
findings is that if an Upper-Caste MP chooses to publicly “follow” or in other words “listen" to someone in the network,
they are more likely to be heard in return than Lower-Caste MPs. This in turn implies that lower caste MPs are not
heard as widely in the network as their counterparts from upper castes, and raises the related question: What is the
position that an MP holds in the network in terms of their connectedness and importance, and how can this be related
to engagement, and what in turn does this have to do with caste identity?
3.2 PageRank Centrality
Within the BJP: Similar to the trends observed in reciprocity, Figure 1(b) (left) shows that Brahmins have higher
median PageRank centrality, thereby hold structural positions in the network that are advantageous in exerting greater
influence in information diffusion than Lower-Caste MPs. In fact, Brahmins also have higher median PageRank than
Intermediary Castes.
We observed that the Brahmins are almost similar in numbers compared to most other castes in the Lok Sabha.
However, they get followed by a relatively higher number of MPs, including other most followed MPs in the network,
thus scoring high median PageRank centrality. On the other hand, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are placed at a
significant disadvantage in the network where they have limited in-network following, thus having least control over
how far the information they broadcast gets consumed in the networks of power.
Further, Other Forward Castes also have significantly higher variance in PageRank than any other castes. These
patterns are thus similar to what was found previously in the context of forming reciprocal links.
Among non-BJP parties: Figure 1(b) (right) shows that both Brahmins and Other Forward Castes have higher median
PageRank within the Non-BJP networks. While this is in alignment with the Upper-Caste dominance we have seen so
far, however, Scheduled Castes have a higher median pagerank than Scheduled Tribes MPs. Similarly, Upper-Caste MPs
have higher variance than Scheduled Tribes MPs alone, making Scheduled Tribes the worse-off caste within Non-BJP.
The above findings highlight that, within BJP, occupying influential positions in the network is associated with higher
following reciprocity, and we indeed find that they are well correlated with a Pearson correlation of 0.8 (p-value<0.0001).
6However, the correlation is relatively weaker within Non-BJP (Pearson correlation of 0.5, p-value<0.0001). Here, we
see that Brahmins, who have higher median PageRank over all the Lower-Caste MPs, do not have higher Reciprocity.
Similarly, while Scheduled Castes within Non-BJP have lower odds of reciprocal links, they occupy relatively important
positions compared to Scheduled Tribes and thus have higher median PageRank.
In summary, both Reciprocity and PageRank together show that Upper-Caste MPs indeed have a greater ease or
ability to form reciprocal connections and are most likely to have higher control over the information consumption
and broadcasting. Similar to the median comparisons, we conducted all correlation tests using a permutation-based
approach.
3.3 Retweets odds ratio and caste hierarchy
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Fig. 2. The left figure shows the ratios of odds of being retweeted by Upper-Caste MPs between each pair of castes
within BJP, and the right figure shows the odds ratios (ORs) within Non-BJP. An OR for a pair of castes is computed as
the ratio of odds for the caste along the row (caste1 in figure) to odds for the caste along the column (caste2 in figure).
All non-zero ORs in the figure are significant at 0.05 level. The ORs at cells ai j and aji are reciprocal of each other due
to symmetry.
Figure 2 shows the pairwise Odds Ratios (ORs) of getting retweeted by Upper-Caste MPs determined using Fisher’s
exact test. It can be observed that ORs are higher (darker regions) in the lower left portion the figures, which indicates
the dominance of Upper-Caste MPs.
Within the BJP: The bottom-most row in figure 2 (left) shows that, within BJP, the odds of being retweeted by
Upper-Caste MPs is significantly higher for Brahmin MPs than those of any other caste. As we we move right from the
left-most cell in the left figure, as we go further up the caste hierarchy, we see odds of getting retweeted by Upper-Caste
improving in comparison to that of a relatively lower caste. For example, the odds of BrahminMPs getting retweeted by
Upper-Caste MPs is 1.5 times higher than the odds of Intermediary Caste MPs being retweeted by the same Upper-Caste
Indian Political Twitter and Caste Discrimination 7
network. Yet, this is much better than the odds of Scheduled Tribes or Scheduled Castes MPs who are 3.5 times and 2.4
times less likely to be retweeted than Brahmins MPs.
Similarly moving up a row from Brahmins, the odds of being retweeted as a Other Forward Castes MPs is significantly
higher for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe MPs at 1.9 and 2.7 respectively. Overall, they are doing much better than
all Lower-Caste. Next is Intermediary Castes, in the row above, who seem to be at an advantage of 2.3 times better odds
of being retweeted by Upper-Caste over arguably the lowest caste in the pool - Scheduled Tribes.
The darker regions in the bottom left cells of the Figure 2 (left) thus indicate that Lower-Caste’s odds of getting
retweeted in the upper caste network is pretty low within BJP. Particularly, the numbers in the first column of the
figure shows that Scheduled Tribe MPs have the lowest odds of getting retweeted in the Upper-Caste network.
Further, since the plot is symmetrical along the diagonal, we also interpret that all Lower-Caste MPs, especially,
Scheduled Tribe, have higher odds of being retweeted by lower caste MPs than upper caste MPs. In other words, our
results indicate the presence of a homophilic relationship among the networks of Upper-Caste and Lower-Caste MPs.
Among Non-BJP parties. Similar to the trends observed in BJP, the Brahmins dominate over Scheduled Castes within
Non-BJP parties too where they have higher odds of being retweeted by Upper-Caste. However there is no significance
difference in odds compared to other Lower-Caste MPs. In particular, Brahmins and Intermediary Caste MPs have odds
more than 10 of being retweeted by Upper-Caste MPs against Scheduled Castes.
Thus in contrast to a relatively strong homophily trend observed within BJP, for Non-BJP, the polarization of
Upper-Caste and Lower-Caste is relatively weaker, with the exception of Scheduled Caste MPs.
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